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Abstract—Following a sequence of hardware designs for a fully
homomorphic crypto-processor – a general purpose processor
that natively runs encrypted machine code on encrypted data in
registers and memory, resulting in encrypted machine states –
proposed by the authors in 2014, we discuss a working prototype
of the first of those, a so-called ‘pseudo-homomorphic’ design.
This processor is in principle safe against physical or software-
based attacks by the owner/operator of the processor on user
processes running in it. The processor is intended as a more
secure option for those emerging computing paradigms that
require trust to be placed in computations carried out in remote
locations or overseen by untrusted operators.
The prototype has a single-pipeline superscalar architecture
that runs OpenRISC standard machine code in two distinct
modes. The processor runs in the encrypted mode (the unprivi-
leged, ‘user’ mode, with a long pipeline) at 60-70% of the speed in
the unencrypted mode (the privileged, ‘supervisor’ mode, with a
short pipeline), emitting a completed encrypted instruction every
1.67-1.8 cycles on average in real trials.
I. INTRODUCTION
IN 2013, the authors published theory [1] showing thatif the arithmetic in a standard processor is modified ap-
propriately, then, given three provisos detailed below, the
processor continues to operate correctly, but all the states
obtained in the processor and memory are encryptions of
the states obtained in an unmodified processor running the
same program. That is a rather unintuitive result, given the
common experience that modifying a computer program even
slightly, or even a slight bug in an arithmetic library – or
worse, in a hardware unit – gives rise to catastrophically
different program results. Nevertheless, it is so, as the 2013
paper proved, and a second paper in 2014 [2] set out several
routes to implemention. However, the provisos referred to
above are not trivial, and represent engineering challenges
to be overcome on the way to a practical product. In this
paper we report on a completed prototype that implements
one of the first and simplest of the options discussed in [2],
which, following the nomenclature there, will be referred to
as KPU (‘krypto processor unit’) designs. The KPU designs
work by modifying arithmetic, and the outcome is a processor
in which user mode processes run with encrypted data in
memory, in registers, and on busses. In principle, the operator
physically in charge of the processor can see only encrypted
data with physical probes, while supervisor mode processes,
which run unencrypted within the processor, likewise can see
only encrypted user data with software probes. The KPU
therefore has relevance to running securely in the Cloud, or
for tamper-proofing computing machinery such as voting or
banking machines in physically remote locations.
The first proviso is that the modified arithmetic within
the processor of a KPU must be a ‘homomorphic image’
of ordinary computer arithmetic. That does not imply that
within the processor merely some 1-to-1 rearrangement of
the conventional (2s complement) encoding of numbers in 32-
bit binary has been effected. In principle, an arbitrary 1-to-n
encryption, such as Rijndael-64 [3] with 32 bits of padding
under the encryption, may be chosen. The block size of the
encryption E (64 bits for Rijndael-64) must coincide with the
register size and physical memory word size in the processor,
so using a 256-bit encryption means designing for 256-bit
registers and memory busses, etc, but apart from that the
choice of encryption is up to the designer.
However, the ‘homomorphic image’ property boils down
to mathematical constraints E(x + y) = f(E(x), E(y)) and
other relations set out in [1], which specify what the encrypted
output E(x+y) from the modified arithmetic logic unit (ALU)
in the processor must be when the encrypted inputs E(x) and
E(y) are presented, so the designer will choose an encryption
that achieves a satisfactory trade-off between the security of
E and the feasibility of implementing an appropriate function
f in hardware. We will return to this topic below, but we
note at this point that the requirement is formally weaker than
classical expressions of homomorphism in encryption, which
have E(x+ y) = E(x) + E(y). That is not quite a question of
‘what is in a name’ as to whether the function is called ‘f ’ or
‘+’; it emphasizes that the designer is not obliged to co-opt
the familiar ‘+’ for f .
The second proviso has to do with memory addressing in
the KPU and the kind of programs that can run in it. Because
data addresses look no different from other numbers, and are
produced dynamically in the course of a program, for example
by adding an offset to a base address, in the KPU designs
of [2], data addresses are encrypted exactly as other data is.
However, program addresses are not encrypted because the
program counter in any processor is most often advanced by a
constant (the length of an instruction in bytes) at each tick of
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Fig. 1. A 32-bit processor arithmetic logic unit (ALU) modified for encrypted
operation (ALU′) with a 64 bit block size by the addition of decryption units
(D) on the inputs and an encryption unit (E) on the output.
the clock. That would allow an attack against the encryption,
if the same encryption were used for program addresses as for
data addresses. The simplest solution, adopted by all the KPU
designs in [2], is not to encrypt program addresses at all.
In consequence, running programs must never combine
program addresses with ordinary data values. A conforming
program may not perform arithmetic computations on program
addresses. In other words, it must never jump to a subroutine
whose address is the square root of Elvis’s birthdate written
backwards. Programs that are written to respect the distinction
between the two types are called crypto-safe in [4], where a
formal type-system for machine code is set out that ensures
machine code programs may run successfully in a KPU.
That appears restrictive because, for example, dynamic
loaders and linkers compute program addresses at run time
and they will not be able to. However, the restriction only
applies to a KPU running in the encrypted mode of operation,
and the designs in [2] envisage that it runs encrypted in the
(unpriviliged) ‘user’ mode while the (privileged) ‘supervisor’
mode runs unencrypted. That allows dynamic loaders to oper-
ate successfully in the conventional way in supervisor mode.
The third proviso referred to in the first paragraph of this
article is due to the fact that many different binary codes
may be generated during execution for what the programmer
intended to be the same memory address, as a consequence of
the encryption of memory addresses and the 1-to-n nature of
good encryptions. All the KPU designs in [2] treat memory as
a possible adversary that should not be privy to the encryption,
so there is no way for the memory unit to know that these
different encryptions should all alias the same data. That
gives rise in programming terms to hardware aliasing, in that
the same address (as seen by a program running under the
encryption) sporadically accesses different data. To avoid it,
programs have to be compiled following a particular style [5]–
[7]. The ‘trick’ depends on the processor being deterministic
at bottom in all things, including calculation of the encrypted
addresses. So to reproduce a particular encrypted address ex-
actly it suffices to store it for recovery later, or to repeat exactly
the calculation that produced it in the first place. Making
use of those two coding strategies, compilation for the KPU
works (we have modified the GNU gcc 4.9.1 compiler and
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Fig. 2. A 16-bit encrypted arithmetic logic unit (ALU′) embedding 8GB
arithmetic tables for each of n operators.
assembler port for the OpenRISC 1.1 architecture (opencores.
org/or1k/Architecture Specification) to suit; the source code
is at sf.net/p/or1k64kpu-gcc and sf.net/p/or1k64kpu-binutils
respectively).
Of the KPU design options set out in [2], the three that are
relevant to our prototype are:
a) Pseudo-homomorphic : Instead of using an encryption
with special properties to achieve the necessary homomorphic
property (proviso #1 above), or innovative hardware in the
ALU, this is in concept an ordinary RISC [8] design with
the standard ALU augmented only by encryption/decryption
(‘codec’) units affixed inline to the inputs and the outputs
(Fig. 1). That is an elegant design only from the mathematical
point of view – we demonstrated formally in [1] that that
design must work correctly, and in a pilot project in Java (see
sf.net/p/kpu) at the same time we constructed an object model
of a standard pipelined RISC processor and dropped in an
ALU modified with codecs ‘fore and aft’ as in Fig. 1 and
verified experimentally that it operated as predicted. But the
design (i) does not immediately offer speed (the encryption
and decryption of data on every instruction lengthens the time
to complete an instruction by a factor of twenty), (ii) does
not appear to offer good prospects for physical security, since
unencrypted data is being processed internally and encryption
and decryption using keys is taking place.
b) Lookup: This design embeds the encrypted arithmetic
tables for the ALU directly (Fig. 2). That obviates both the
need for codecs and for keys (and corresponding questions of
provision and safekeeping). However, the space requirement
for as little as 16-bit operation is already considerable, and
20-bit operation is probably the limit with present technology
(requiring access to Terabyte-sized RAM storage for each of
the tables for operations such as addition or multiplication;
note, however, that such motherboards are already available off
the shelf – see for example the Supermicro Xeon 7000 -based
range at supermicro.com/products/motherboard/Xeon7000/).
One might consider increasing the number of bits by putting
ALUs together in modular fashion, but aside from anything
else that means memory hardware that offers multiple address-
ing for simultaneous retrieval, if the storage requirement is not
to multiply up with the number of modules. At most dual-
port (read twice simultaneously) RAM is available at present,
though quad-port RAM is not far off.
c) Partially homomorphic: The problem with the fully
homomorphic encryption (FHE; homomorphic with respect to
both addition and multiplication) first created by Gentry [9],
[10] in 2009 and its subsequent improvements and improved
implementations at IBM and elsewhere [11], [12] is that it runs
at on the order of one bit-op per second, with approximately
a million-bit block size, so it is quite impractical for use.
Otherwise it would fit perfectly in a KPU design, requiring
no modification of the ALU from standard as far as addition
and multiplication go (division, shift right and the comparator
relations would still require modification, however).
A half-way house towards an encryption that achieves the
‘homomorphic image’ requirement on its own account is a
partially homomorphic encryption (PHE). RSA [13] is the
canonical example, but it is homomorphic with respect to
multiplication, in that E(x∗y) = E(x)∗E(y), which is not very
convenient. The Pallier encryption [14] is additively homomor-
phic instead, which lends itself much more easily to use in a
KPU. The idea would be to implement addition in the modified
ALU as standard addition over the Pallier encryption, making
use of its homomorphic property, E(x+ y) = E(x)+ E(y), to
implement the other standard ALU operations, multiplication,
division, etc, in terms of addition.
Unfortunately, that is mathematically impossible. However,
a single extra look-up table for the signs of encrypted numbers
makes it possible. The explanation is that the single operation
‘if (x>k0 & y > k1 & . . . ) then x−=K1, y−=K2, . . . ’ is
computationally complete – this is the only statement form
in Conway’s famous Fractran programming language [15] –,
and that may be implemented given the homomorphic addition
plus table of signs, then all the other (encrypted) operations
of the ALU may be implemented in terms of it, either directly
in hardware or as software routines. Indeed, an encrypted
processor based on a stack machine model (instead of the
von Neumann model) with the Fractran statement as its only
non-control machine instruction, together with a 16-bit Pallier
crypto-system plus table of signs is described in [16], so we
have confirmation that the Pallier system plus table of signs is
feasible. A functional difference between the KPUs discussed
here and the stack machine of [16] is that the latter does not
experience hardware aliasing (see proviso #3 above), since no
(encrypted) memory addresses are involved (stack ‘addresses’
are explicit unencrypted offsets from the bottom of the stack,
essentially individual local variable names). However, stack
machines are not generally implemented directly in hardware,
and it would be unwise to expect that interfacing one with all
the i/o interrupts, caches, busses and other paraphernalia found
on board a modern processor would be easy. A 1 Terabyte
table of signs is enough to feed a 43-bit Pallier encryption,
however, no matter whether the encrypted processor is a stack
machine or von Neumann design.
Moreover, there is a technique set out in [2] that in
principle ‘cubes the security’, while only tripling the storage
requirement. The idea (‘ABC typing’) is to encrypt each of
the elements f(a, b) = c of an encrypted calculation using
a different encryption. That is a = EA(x), b = EB(y),
c = EC(z). The compiler can generate code that respects
this type discipline and the processor ALU can be designed
to implement it. While an attacker may guess the key for
encryption A, say, in order to know he/she is right about A, the
keys for encryptions B and C must also be guessed. Only then
can the attacker confirm that an observed c encrypts z that is
the sum of x and y. If the keyspace for each of encryptions
A, B and C is size 43 bits, then 3×43 = 129 bits of keyspace
must be searched overall. The technique is readily applied
when the function f is implemented via lookup table, requiring
three lookup tables instead of one (inputs of type A and B,
B and C, C and A respectively are valid). In the case when
the f is the Pallier system addition, since the Pallier partial
homomorphism may be ‘upgraded’ to fully homomorphic
by a lookup table of signs (the homomorphic multiplication
then being implemented by a software routine) the technique
described by Gentry in [9] for changing from one FHE to
another without decryption may be applied (essentially: run
the decryption algorithm of one over the other’s encryption,
using the second’s encryption of the first’s key).
Another technique discussed in [2] and applicable to all
design solutions is to encrypt each bit of data differently. A
16-bit lookup-table solution for a 1-bit processor becomes a
32x16-bit lookup-table solution for 32-bit operation, requiring
also 16-to-16-bit translation tables between 1-bit ALU mod-
ules. But the technique does not improve security beyond 16
bits, because the arithmetic of the least significant bit can be
attacked independently, then the second bit can be attacked,
and so on, so we will not consider that direction here.
The prototype described in this paper implements option
(a) above, the ‘pseudo-homomorphic’ option. Option (b), a
lookup table-based solution, is not viable at present, because
too much memory is required for acceptable security. Oprion
(c), using the Pallier or similar partially homomorphic cryp-
tosystem, also still needs a Terabyte-size table of signs for
even 43 bit encryption, which is also not sufficiently secure for
general use. The enhancements using ABC typing discussed
above would improve the numbers, but it is still the subject of
research. To be acceptable for, say, banking applications, right
now a pseudo-homomorphic solution using a standard n-bit
encryption best fits the bill. Moreover, n can conveniently be
adjusted from one prototype to another in line with hardware
resources, matching register size and bus width.
The objections to a pseudo-homomorphic solution are those
already noted: (i) it is slow, (ii) it is physically vulnera-
ble. However, (ii) is an objection already overcome [17] by
Smartcard manufacturers, who overlay parts of their chips that
contain keys and encryption apparatus with delicate traces that
cause the chip to fail if disrupted by a physical probe, so
it is not an insuperable objection. Memory does not contain
unencrypted user data in a KPU, so it is not vulnerable to
‘cold boot’ [18]–[20] attacks either (essentially, physically
freezing the memory sticks in order to retain an image of the
DRAM contents even without power), and only the processor
chip needs Smartcard-like protection. As to (i), we have been
able to innovate in the architecture design so as to achieve
in encrypted running 60-70% of the speed in unencrypted
running, with an encrypted instruction being completed every
1.67-1.8 cycles, as described below.
II. ARCHITECTURE
The prototype KPU is based on the OpenRISC 1.1 32/64
bit architecture and instruction set specification (opencores.
org/or1k/Architecture Specification). It runs instructions uni-
formly 32 bits in length on 32- or 64-bit data stored in memory
and registers. Encrypted data physically occupies 64 bits, but
it contains only 32 bits of meaningful data when decrypted.
In user mode, the processor runs on encrypted data and
executes only the 32-bit instruction set (i.e., those instructions
that target 32-bit data). A 64-bit instruction run in user mode
raises an ‘illegal instruction’ exception. As per the OpenRISC
specification, user mode instructions access all 32 general
purpose registers (GPRs), and also a very few permitted
special purpose registers (SPRs). Attempts to write ‘out of
bounds’ SPRs are ignored in user mode and zero is read.
In supervisor mode the processor may execute either 32- or
64-bit instructions and access to registers is unrestricted. There
is no enforced division of memory into ‘supervisor’ and ‘user’
parts, so a supervisor mode process can read user data from
memory, but the user data will be in encrypted form.
OpenRISC instructions divide into two kinds: ‘immediate’
instructions, which carry 16 bits of data in the (32-bit)
instruction itself, and ‘register’ instructions, which do not.
The immediate instructions are problematic in user mode
because we want them to carry data in encrypted form. But
encrypted data takes up 64 bits and an instruction is only 32
bits long, so it does not fit. To solve this problem, a prefix
instruction has been added to the instuction set. An immediate
instruction will be preceded in the instruction stream by two
prefix instructions, each carrying a 24-bit segment of the
encrypted datum, and the immediate instruction itself carries
only the final 16-bit segment. Those OpenRISC immediate
instructions that are supposed to carry fewer than 16 bits of
data (register shifts and rotations each carry 5 or 6 bits) have
been respecified to contain exactly 16 bits of data.
The instruction pipeline in (unencrypted) supervisor mode is
the standard short 5-stage fetch, decode, read, execute, write
pipeline expected of a RISC processor [8], except that it is
physically embedded in a longer pipeline that is traversed in
full by (encrypted) user mode instructions. The pipeline is
configured in two different ways for the user mode instructions
as shown in Fig. 3 (the hardware for those stages with two
different configurations is doubled). The reason is that, in
order to reduce the frequency with which codecs are brought
into action for user mode instructions, ALU operation is
effectively extended in the time dimension, so that it covers a
series of consecutive (encrypted) arithmetic operations in user
mode. Only the beginning of the series is associated with a
decryption event, when encrypted data in memory or registers
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Fig. 3. Physically the same pipeline is configured in two different ways, ‘A’
and ‘B’, for two different kinds of user mode instructions during encrypted
working.
is converted, and only the end of the series is associated with
an encryption event. Longer series mean less frequent codec
use. It turns out that two pipeline configurations cover the
needs of instruction processing when codec use is required.
The ‘A’ configuration is deployed when a store instruction
puts an encrypted result into memory, or a load instruction
decrypts incoming data from memory. The ‘B’ configuration
is used when encrypted immediate data in an ‘add immediate’
instruction is read in. Instructions that do not exercise the
codec pass through with the pipeline in ‘A’ configuration,
because the early execution makes results available for early
forwarding to instructions entering behind, avoiding pipeline
stalls. The codec covers 10 stages in this implementation.
To support this mode of operation, the ALU posseses a
private set of user-mode-only registers that shadow the GPRs
(and the few SPRs accessible in user mode). These are
intended to contain the decrypted version of the encrypted
data in the ‘real’ GPRs and SPRs. They are mapped in during
read and write stage of a user mode instruction, and mapped
out for supervisor mode instructions, so they are unavailable
to supervisor mode. This protocol automatically maintains the
register entries in decrypted form in the shadow registers from
one instruction to the next during user mode operation.
Additionally, a small user-mode-only data cache caches the
unencrypted version of any encrypted data that is written to
memory duing user mode operation. On load from memory,
this cache is checked first. Almost all execution stack reads
in normal operation are intercepted by this mechanism. The
cache is physically within the processor boundary, so will be
covered by the measures that protect the processor chip from
spying or interference (e.g., Smartcard-like fabrication).
Note that in the KPU, program addresses are unencrypted
(as opposed to data addresses, which are encrypted), which
potentially is a source of confusion in user mode, because
unencrypted data is kept in shadow registers within the ALU,
while encrypted data is passed to memory and the ‘real’ reg-
isters. A particular protocol addresses the issue: unencrypted
32-bit addresses zero-filled to 64 bits are regarded as the
‘encrypted’ form, and they are ‘decrypted’ to an ‘unencrypted’
form consisting of the same data with the top 16 bits of 64
rewritten to 0x7fff. Thus an instruction such as jump-and-link
(JAL) in user mode, which fills the return address (RA) register
with the program address of the next instruction, writes the
zero-filled address to the RA shadow register, and the 0x7ff
form to the real RA register. The padding under the encryption
is always arranged so that real encrypted data avoids looking
like either of these forms of program address.
In principle, encrypted addresses emanating from the KPU
fall anywhere in the full 64-bit range (although the addresses
under the encryption are 32-bit). Since no real machine ever
has a full 64 bits-worth of memory available, conventionally
address translation takes place within the memory manage-
ment unit to a physically backed area of memory via a
‘translation look-aside buffer’ (TLB). However, the TLB is
conventionally organised at page-sized granularities, saying
where each 8KB-sized area of logical addressing should be
translated to in physical addressing terms. That architecture
is not appropriate for a KPU, because encrypted addresses
are not clustered, if the encryption is any good. Instead, the
KPU’s TLB must be organised with word-sized granularity.
Further, all encrypted addresses generated in user mode are
remapped by the TLB to a pre-set range with the allocation
serially ordered by ‘first-come, first-served’. Since data that
will later be accessed together tends also to be addressed for
the first time in close sequence, this allows conventional cache
lookahead policies to operate successfully.
Moreover, it has turned out to be possible in this ‘pseudo-
homomorphic’ design to pass the unencrypted data address
to the memory unit during the processing of load and store
instructions, with no additional processing. We are nervous of
the security implications, so we do not suggest that that should
be done. However, the bare 32-bit address could be hashed or
encrypted in a different way to 64 bits from there.
III. PERFORMANCE
The OpenRISC ‘or1ksim’ simulator (opencores.org/or1k/
Or1ksim) has been modified to run the KPU proto-
type discussed here. The code comes with the OpenRISC
specification-compliant exception conditions and actions built
in, as well as a comprehensive set of peripheral devices,
caches, buffers, etc. It contains a Verilog compiler backend as
an alternative to direct execution in the simulator. The simula-
tor was upgraded to 64 bit simulation from 32 bits (see sf.net/
p/or1ksim64ptb), following the OpenRISC 1.1 specification
document at opencores.org/or1k/Architecture Specification#
OpenRISC 1000 architecture 1.1, and then the processor core
simulation was changed to encode the pipeline discussed in
this paper, with full forwarding of data between pipeline
stages for instructions running in the same processor mode,
and a branch prediction cache. Performance measurements on
the simulator are made directly on the pipeline, and are not
estimates. Supervisor mode and user mode are accounted sep-
arately, so comparisons between encrypted and unencrypted
working are made on the same architecture. That modified
simulator code is available from sf.net/p/or1ksim64ptb.
The processor instruction set tests from the or1ksim suite
have been modified to run in a KPU. The original tests ran
in supervisor mode, which would not have tested a KPU, in
which supervisor mode is unencrypted. The assembler source
code was rewritten to run in (encrypted) user mode instead,
making system calls when access to data such as the state
of the carry or overflow flags in the processor status register
(SR) is required for the test reports. OpenRISC’s port of the
GNU ‘gas’ assembler v2.24.51 has been modified to produce
encrypted machine code for this KPU target and the modified
source code is available at sf.net/p/or1k64kpu-binutils/.
One question that modifying the testsuite has settled is
whether or not it is possible to run encrypted code that
does anything useful in a conventional sense. After all, local
peripherals work unencrypted, without privy access to en-
cryption mechanisms in the processor or elsewhere, so even
output on the local display seems a priori to be problematic.
Fortunately, the original or1ksim code is ‘tricked out’ with a
special debugging no-op instruction that sidesteps the need to
interact with an output peripheral and the testsuite uses it to
do all its report I/O. The ‘trick’ no-op prints the contents of
register r3 directly on the screen, and we have not had to do
anything more for I/O other than maintain the use of those no-
op instructions in the testsuite code. In user mode, the ALU’s
shadow r3 register provides a decrypted value for printout, and
in supervisor mode the value in the r3 register is unencrypted,
so the testsuite printout is comprehsible to an observer.
Aside from printing, however, yes, it has been possible to
write all the (thirty or forty) system calls for execution in
supervisor mode that proved necessary. There are calls, for
example, to blindly set or clear various SR flags that determine
if an arithmetic overflow triggers an exception or not. System
status flags that may be set in user mode are cleared by the
hardware when changing to supervisor mode, so supervisor
mode cannot get information from them (the flags are saved
by the hardware in a special register to which supervisor mode
has no access for recovery to user mode later), but that has
not proved fatal to full reporting of the exception handling.
Table I displays the performance statistics summary from
the modified instruction set add test (‘is-add-test’) of the
or1ksim testsuite. The statically compiled executable contains
185628 machine code instructions, which occupy 742512
bytes in the 769454 byte executable, the rest being comprised
of the executable file headers, symbol table, etc. Table I
shows that when this test was run (successfully) to completion,
222006 instructions were executed, so there are few loops and
subroutines (the code is largely built using assembler macros)
in 315640 cycles. If one reckons with a 1GHz clock, then the
speed was just over 700Kips (instructions per second) overall.
In supervisor mode, pipeline occupation is just under 90%,
at 892Kips for a 1GHz clock (wait states, cycles in which the
pipeline fails to complete an instruction, comprise 4.9% of the
45.2% total), which one may take as a baseline for a single
pipeline superscalar design. In user mode pipeline occupation
is only 54.9%, as measured by numbers of non-wait states,
for 549Kips with a 1GHz clock. Measured against supervisor
TABLE I
PERFORMANCE DATA, OR1KSIM TESTSUITE INSTRUCTION SET ADD TEST.
@exit : cycles 315640, instructions 222006
mode user super
register instructions 0.2% 0.2%
immediate instructions 7.3% 9.2%
load instructions 0.9% 2.8%
(cached) ( 0.9%)
store instructions 0.9% 0.0%
(cached) ( 0.9%)
branch instructions 1.0% 4.9%
jump instructions 1.1% 4.8%
no-op instructions 6.4% 15.8%
prefix instructions 11.5% 0.0%
mf/tspr instructions 0.1% 2.7%
sys/trap instructions 0.5% 0.0%
wait states 24.7% 4.9%
(stalls) (22.1%) ( 3.8%)
(refills) ( 2.7%) ( 1.1%)
total 54.8% 45.2%
Branch Prediction Buffer
hits 10328 ( 55%) misses 8219 ( 44%)
right 8335 ( 44%) right 6495 ( 35%)
wrong 1993 ( 10%) wrong 1724 ( 9%)
User Data Cache
read hits 2942 (99%) misses 0 ( 0%)
write hits 2933 (99%) misses 9 ( 0%)
mode, that is 61.6% of the unencrypted speed.
The wait states are caused by real data hazards in the
pipeline. Most (84%) are due to a load instruction feeding
directly to an arithmetic instruction. The stall occurs because
the data address for the load instruction is only calculated
in execute stage, so the data cannot at that time already be
available to the instruction sitting in read stage just behind.
The data indicates that a dual pipeline might be beneficial,
perhaps enabling speed over 70% of unencrypted running.
IV. CONCLUSION
A superscalar pipeline design for an encrypted processor
has been described here, with performance measured at 60-
70% of unencrypted processing while embedding a 10-cycle
(Rijndael) 64-bit encryption. Registers, memory and busses
contain encrypted data in this ‘pseudo-homomorphic’ design.
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